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 THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS: 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 
THROUGH FAIR TRADE IN THE HEMISPHERE 
CONGRESSMAN ADAM H. PUTNAM* 
“We have a great vision before us: a fully democratic hemisphere, 
bound together by good will and free trade.”1  
 The Free Trade Area of the Americas is a proposal that would cre-
ate the largest free-trade zone in the world, encompassing nearly all 
of the countries of the Western Hemisphere, a population of 825 mil-
lion people in thirty-four countries and a GDP of US $13 trillion. Ac-
cording to the U.S. Trade Representative, “The Free Trade [Area] of 
the Americas (FTAA) is the cornerstone of President Bush’s vision for 
trade in the Western Hemisphere—a plan that would foster economic 
growth and opportunity, promote regional integration and 
strengthen democracies.”2  
 The countries that would be included in the FTAA account for the 
vast majority of the world’s orange juice production. The states of Sao 
Paulo, Brazil, and Florida, United States, together produce approxi-
mately eighty-five percent of the world’s orange juice, with the re-
mainder derived from Mexico and Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, 
and Italy, Spain, and Greece in Europe.3  
 While recognizing the goals of free and fair trade among nations, 
an FTAA that includes tariff4 reductions on products including Flor-
ida citrus is not in the best economic interest of our hemisphere. It 
would prove damaging to the economic infrastructure of the state of 
                                                                                                                  
 * Representative to the United States House of Representatives for the 12th Dis-
trict of Florida. B.S., University of Florida. 
 1. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, TRADE FACTS, FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS: THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A 
HEMISPHERIC MARKET PLACE  2 (2003) (quoting President George W. Bush, 3rd. Summit of 
the Americas, April 2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere 
/ftaa2002/2003-02-11-tradefacts-english.PDF. 
 2. Id. at 1. 
 3. THOMAS H. SPREEN ET AL., UNIV. OF FLA. INST. OF FOOD & AGRIC. SCIENCES, THE 
IMPACT OF ELIMINATION OF THE U.S. ORANGE JUICE TARIFF ON THE MARKET FOR PROC-
ESSED ORANGE PRODUCTS 4 (2002), available at http://www.fred.ifas.ufl.edu 
/iatpc/docs/policy_brief/PBTC_02-3.pdf. 
 4. In 1930, the citrus tariff was established at 70 cents per gallon for all orange juice. 
In 1948, the Geneva Round of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
rule making entity governing world trade, reduced the tariff by nearly one half to 35.02 
cents per gallon (cpg). In 1972, the Kennedy GATT Round reduced the tariff to 20.07 cpg 
for not-from-concentrate juice only. The Uruguay Round of GATT, completed in 1994, es-
tablished the latest round of tariff reductions for orange juice effective in 1997. It immedi-
ately lowered the from-concentrate tariff to 34.15 cpg and, effective in 2000, it lowered the 
rate again to 29.72 cpg. Also effective in 2000, the Uruguay Round lowered the tariff on 
not-from-concentrate products to 17.04 cpg. Bob Crawford, Executive Director, Florida De-
partment of Citrus, Presentation to the Florida Agricultural Trade Advisory Committee 
(Oct. 7, 2002) (presentation on file with the author). 
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Florida, would not be in the best interest of consumers, and would 
not achieve the stated goals of the Administration, including greater 
opportunity and economic growth throughout the Western Hemi-
sphere. Initiatives to limit the scope of the FTAA, which are neces-
sary to address the national economic interests of all the participants 
and reenergize the negotiations to reach a constructive outcome, are 
positive steps toward fostering regional competition and economic 
opportunity among nations.  
 Any tariff reduction on processed orange juice will dramatically 
affect the state of Florida, and will devastate the U.S. industry that 
grows oranges for processing, which has an estimated industry out-
put of 9.13 billion dollars. 5 The Florida citrus industry and the global 
citrus market are unique and import sensitive due to the structure, 
dynamics, and history of the global orange juice industry. Perhaps 
the most significant factor is that the Florida citrus industry is Bra-
zil’s only competitor of global significance. World orange juice pro-
duction is concentrated chiefly between only two states in the world: 
Florida and Sao Paulo, Brazil.6 
 Given this concentration of production, any reduction or elimina-
tion of the citrus tariff would not result in lowered prices to consum-
ers. Elimination of the tariff would create a monopoly-type environ-
ment, as competition would be eliminated and the price of U.S. or-
ange juice could rise because the one source of production remaining 
in the world—Brazil—could dictate the price. 
 The future expansion of export markets is welcome. The Florida 
citrus industry does not object to the improvement of U.S. ties 
throughout the world via stronger trading relationships; it has sup-
ported many such agreements over the years, such as the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative and others. 7 
 There have been four major trade initiatives related to citrus since 
the mid-1980’s. These are the Japanese Beef and Citrus Agreement; 
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), which elimi-
nated tariffs on citrus from Belize, Honduras, and the Dominican 
Republic; the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
which phased out United States and Mexican orange juice tariffs; 
and the Uruguay Round of the GATT.8 The latter three agreements 
                                                                                                                  
 5. ALAN HODGES ET AL., UNIV. OF FLA. INST. OF FOOD & AGRIC. SCIENCES, ECONOMIC 
IMPACT OF FLORIDA’S CITRUS INDUSTRY, 1999-2000 at 3 (2001), available at 
http://economicimpact.ifas.ufl.edu/publications/er01-2-citrus.pdf. 
 6. SPREEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 4.  
 7. The Status of the World Trade Organization Negotiations on Agriculture: Hearing 
Before the House Comm. on Agric., 108th Cong. 122 (2003) [hereinafter Trade Negotiations] 
(statement of Andrew LaVigne, Florida Citrus Mutual), available at 
http://agriculture.house.gov/hearings/1085.pdf.  
 8. THOMAS H. SPREEN, UNIV. OF FLA. DEPT. OF FOOD & RESOURCE ECON., THE FREE 
TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS AND THE FLORIDA CITRUS INDUSTRY 2-5, 11 (2002), at 
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served to encourage orange juice production in regions in competition 
with the United States. While CBERA and NAFTA have reduced tar-
iffs for competing suppliers of orange juice in the Caribbean and 
Mexico, increasing imports into the United States, Brazil remains by 
far the most important import supplier of orange juice to the U.S. 
market. 9 Therefore, the stakes for Florida citrus production in the 
FTAA are much higher than in previous trade agreements. 10  
 Florida orange growers are the most efficient in the world in 
terms of production yield per acre.11  Yet, neither the state of Florida 
nor American consumers are expected to benefit from global trade 
liberalization under the current conditions: concentration of power in 
the hands of a few Brazilian producers. The stated goals of expand-
ing democracy throughout the hemisphere will also not be realized or 
enhanced by this effort. Until this concentration is diminished, fair 
trade is established, and consumer purchasing power is increased 
around the world, the United States and Western Europe will remain 
the targeted markets for orange juice, and the economic survival of 
the Florida citrus industry will continue to be contingent on the exis-
tence of the U.S. orange juice tariff on Brazilian juice.12 
 Given the oligopistic structure of the Brazilian citrus industry, as 
well as the significant disparity in labor and environmental stan-
dards between the two countries, the U.S. orange juice tariff provides 
a mechanism to provide fair trade between the two nations. The tar-
iff counteracts the market power of Brazil’s highly concentrated in-
dustry (which sells globally a dollar-denominated commodity made 
with progressively devalued local inputs), the extreme pricing pres-
sure inflicted by frequent devaluation of Brazil’s currency, and the 
predatory pricing behavior of the Brazilian orange juice oligopoly. 
Finally, in a nation that places a high value on environmental and 
work protections, the tariff serves to harmonize market production 
costs between the two citrus-growing countries. All imports from 
Brazil are subject to the most favored nation (MFN) duty, which is 
currently 28.9 cents per pound solid for frozen concentrate orange 
juice (FCOJ), and 17 cents per single-strength gallon.13  
 The concentration of production among five large Brazilian orange 
juice processors has enabled the South American country to place 
                                                                                                                  
http://www.fred.ifas.ufl.edu/iatpc/ppt/con-11-14-02/ses5/order1-spreen.ppt (last visited Oct. 
13, 2003).  
 9. Id. at 4-13.  
 10. Id. at 22-27.  
 11. Trade Negotiations, supra note 7, at 122.  
 12. Id. at 122-23. 
 13. THOMAS H. SPREEN, UNIV. OF FLA.  DEPT. OF FOOD &  RESOURCE ECON., THE 
INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE U.S. ORANGE JUICE TARIFF AND U.S. ORANGE JUICE DEMAND 4 
(2003), at http://www.flcitrusmutual.com/resources/PDFs/drspreen.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 
2002). 
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downward pressure on processed orange prices in Brazil. This group 
accounts for approximately eighty percent of Brazil’s FCOJ produc-
tion.14 These companies indirectly control nearly all of Brazil’s FCOJ 
exports, as they also operate and control Brazil’s tank-ship distribu-
tion system. 15 These large Brazilian processors benefit from advan-
tages brought by past subsidization and dumping, lax environmental 
protection, weak and largely unenforced labor laws, frequent na-
tional currency devaluation (which reduces the relative cost of pro-
duction inputs and provides false incentives to overproduce), and oli-
gopolistic price manipulation.16  
 Expansion and continuation of export markets for U.S. orange 
juice, particularly throughout the European Union, has been hin-
dered by Brazilian orange ju ice prices that frequently appear to be 
below Brazilian cost of production. As a result of an affirmative Sun-
set Review Determination in 1999, an antidumping order remains in 
effect on several processors of FCOJ from Brazil; the applicable 
dumping margins for the suppliers are significant.17 In 2001, the 
president of the Italian Consortium of Citrus Processors appealed to 
the European Commission for protection, citing Brazilian predatory 
practices of selling processed orange juice at prices below the cost of 
production.18 “[T]he long-term annual average trend in the price of 
Brazilian orange juice exports has been downward during the past 
decade and a half. Such constant downward price pressure in foreign 
markets makes the exporting of U.S. orange juice nearly impossi-
ble.”19  
 In addition, the U.S. Agricultural Attaché in Sao Paulo has indi-
cated that for ten consecutive seasons, from 1991/92 through 
2000/01, initial Brazilian estimates of orange juice production have 
understated actual output by up to twenty-seven percent, distorting 
world orange juice prices. 20  
 Florida orange juice producers are eager to expand juice exports 
overseas; however, it is unlikely that growth in U.S. citrus export po-
tential could offset the significant displacement of U.S. juice in the 
                                                                                                                  
 14. Trade Negotiations, supra note 7, at 123.  
 15. In the Matter of Market Access in the Free Trade Area of the Americas Negotia-
tions: Hearing Before the Trade Policy Staff Committee, Office of the United States Trade 
Representative 3 (2002) [hereinafter Market Access] (statement of Andrew LaVigne, Florida 
Citrus Mutual), available at http://www.flcitrusmutual.com/resources/PDFs/marketaccess 
.pdf. 
 16. Trade Negotiations, supra note 7, at 122-23. 
 17. Market Access, supra note 15, at 8. 
 18. Id. at 9.  
 19. Id.   
 20. President Bush’s Trade Agenda for 2003: Hearing Before the House Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 108th Cong. 9 (2003) [hereinafter Trade Agenda] (statement of Andrew 
LaVigne, CEO, Florida Citrus Mutual).  
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domestic market as a result of U.S. tariff reductions. According to the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. orange juice exports dropped 5% 
between 2001 and 2003, with exports to Japan down 64% and to 
Europe down 53%, primarily due to less expensive imports from Bra-
zil.21  
 While the citrus industry welcomes greater access to foreign mar-
kets, the marginal benefits of exporting to South and Central Ameri-
can markets, which have historically low demand, would be rendered 
meaningless if the U.S. orange juice tariff is reduced.22 The U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture, in its assessment Free Trade Area of the 
Americas: What Are the Benefits for U.S. Agriculture?, concluded: “In 
terms of shares of U.S. trade, . . . the region is substantially more 
important as a source of imports for the U.S. than as a destination 
for U.S. exports.”23 The report also noted, “The agreement could have 
major implications for U.S. sugar, peanuts, and orange juice . . . . 
Removal of [the] tariffs may create incentives to import less–
expensive Brazilian orange juice, which may displace some Florida 
juice.”24  
 The comparative harvesting costs for processed oranges in Florida 
and Sao Paulo demonstrate the vast disparity in production costs. In 
Sao Paulo, harvesting costs, including picking and hauling, are esti-
mated at roughly one-quarter the cost in southwest Florida, as Flor-
ida production costs are an average of US $.32 per pound solids 
(pps.), in comparison to harvesting costs in Sao Paulo of US $.08 pps. 
When delivered transportation shipment costs to the United States 
and the tariff are included, the cost of production in both countries is 
roughly the same: $1.05 pps. (Florida) and $1.03 pps. (Brazil).25 
 The enforcement of child labor laws has also been brought into 
question. A 1998 U.S. Department of Labor report to Congress al-
leged that close to 150,000 children are employed during Brazil’s cit-
rus harvesting season, picking in severe heat for as long as twelve 
hours a day.26 Another Department of Labor report noted that Brazil-
ian farms regularly employ children, paying them $3.00 for a 14 hour 
                                                                                                                  
 21. FLORIDA DEP’T OF CITRUS, FLORIDA CITRUS ECONOMIC INDICATORS 5 (July 2002), 
available at http://www.fred.ifas.ufl.edu/citrus/pubs/economic/index.htm. 
 22. Market Access, supra note 15, at 3. 
 23. Mary Burfisher & John Link, Free Trade Area of the Americas: What Are the Bene-
fits for U.S. Agriculture?, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Apr. 2000, at 15, 17, available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/agoutlook/apr2000/ao270e.pdf. 
 24. Id. at 16. 
 25. RONALD P. MURARO ET AL., UNIV. OF FLA. INST. OF FOOD & AGRIC.  SCIENCES, 
COMPARATIVE COSTS OF GROWING CITRUS IN FLORIDA AND SAO PAULO (BRAZIL) FOR THE 
2000-01 SEASON 2-3 (2002), available at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/FE364. 
 26. BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BY THE SWEAT & TOIL OF 
CHILDREN: VOLUME V: EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE CHILD LABOR 18-19 (1998). 
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day—or 22 cents an hour.27 The average agricultural wage in Florida 
is over $9 an hour28 and child labor is strictly prohibited. 
 In an ideal free market world economy where basic and equiva-
lent labor, environmental, and health/safety laws exist and are en-
forced, where world production and prices are not controlled by a 
single oligopolistic industry, and where currency devaluations do 
not tip the scales dramatically in favor of the foreign exporters, the 
law of natural advantages might outweigh arguments for tariff 
protection.29  
 However, “Brazil’s advantages are not ‘natural’ and the playing 
field is grossly skewed. The tariff is the only offset on which this un-
subsidized U.S. industry can rely to counter these ‘unnatural’ advan-
tages.”30 
 The studies of an elimination of the U.S. orange juice tariff on 
Brazil suggest that while the benefit to Brazilian orange producers 
would not be large, as production would be expected to increase 
slightly, the impact on Florida producers would be significant. Pro-
duction in Florida would contract and on-tree prices would decline 
substantially. If the tariff were eliminated, producer income is esti-
mated to decline by twenty-five percent. Projected on-tree prices in 
Florida, after elimination of the tariff, would be, in most cases, below 
the cost of production, suggesting further decreases in Florida orange 
output.31  
 Increased Brazilian imports by the United States would come at 
the expense of Brazilian exports to the European Union (EU) and 
Japan, if both the EU and Japan were to maintain their FCOJ tar-
iffs; supply in these two regions would be adversely affected by either 
a phaseout or immediate elimination of the United State’s FCOJ tar-
iff. Furthermore, the positive effect on Brazil would be relatively 
small, as under tariff elimination, the United States is expected to 
account for less than ten percent of Sao Paulo’s market. Therefore, 
the impact on Brazilian growers and processors would be diluted by 
the fact that the majority of its products would still be sent to other 
markets. 32 
 Smaller orange producing countries such as Mexico, Belize, and 
Costa Rica would also be adversely affected, as these countries cur-
                                                                                                                  
 27. BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BY THE SWEAT & TOIL OF 
CHILDREN: VOLUME II: THE USE OF CHILD LABOR IN U.S. AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS AND 
FORCED AND BONDED CHILD LABOR 67 (1995).  
 28. FLORIDA AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS SERVICE, FARM LABOR 1 (2003), at 
http://www.nass.usda.gov/fl/econ/labor/2003/lab0803.pdf. 
 29. Market Access, supra note 15, at 15-16.  
 30. Id. at 16.  
 31. SPREEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 10-11. 
 32. Id. at 13. 
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rently enjoy preferential treatment in the U.S. market. Reduced tar-
iffs for Brazilian exporters would result in lower prices received for 
exports from third-party countries. 33  
 A 2002 University of Florida report entitled, The Impact of Elimi-
nation of the U.S. Orange Juice Tariff on the Market for Processed 
Orange Products stated, “The clear conclusion drawn from the fig-
ures presented . . . is that U.S. imports of FCOJ from Brazil will in-
crease substantially if the U.S. orange juice tariff is eliminated.”34 
Under the analysis conducted, exports of FCOJ from Sao Paulo un-
der elimination of the U.S. tariff were projected to grow from 53,000 
metric tons to 313,000 metric tons, an increase of 500%.35  
 A General Accounting Office (GAO) report to Congress entitled, 
Free Trade Area of the Americas: Negotiators Move Toward Agree-
ment That Will Have Benefits, Costs to U.S. Economy, found that cer-
tain U.S. sectors, including textiles, apparel, and agricultural goods 
such as sugar and citrus, may face increased imports and declining 
production if barriers are lowered.36 The GAO report noted that both 
the United States and other FTAA countries view expanding access 
to agricultural markets as one of their priorities. 37 However, several 
outstanding issues remain. First, FTAA countries must decide how to 
address domestic subsidies, as several FTAA countries object to U.S. 
farm support payments on many agricultural goods.38 It should be 
noted that U.S. citrus does not receive government subsidies. In ad-
dition, several sectors would prefer to address market access issues 
on a multilateral level through the World Trade Organization, rather 
than on a regional basis in the FTAA. Finally, within tariff negotia-
tions, FTAA countries must decide how to treat import sensitive ag-
ricultural products. 39 The GAO Report noted, “often a sensitive prod-
uct from one country (such as orange juice in the United States) is a 
competitive product for another country (Brazil).”40 
                                                                                                                  
 33. Id. at 15. 
 34. Id. at 13.  
 35. Id. at 32 tbl.14.  
 36. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE , REPORT TO THE RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, 
COMM. ON FIN., U.S. SENATE, GAO-01-1027, FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS: 
NEGOTIATORS MOVE TOWARD AGREEMENT THAT WILL HAVE BENEFITS,  COSTS TO U.S. 
ECONOMY 101-02 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d011027.pdf. 
 37. Id. at 35-36.  
 38. Id. at 38.  
 39. Id. at 5.  
 40. Id. In July 2002, Congress approved, and the President signed into law, legisla-
tion providing the President with Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). Under the terms of 
the trade legislation, the Administration was granted the authority to negotiate interna-
tional trade agreements subject to an up-or-down vote by Congress, not subject to congres-
sional amendment. Special provisions were included in TPA for import sensitive products, 
including orange juice, requiring that special consultative measures be taken by the Ad-
ministration to advise Congress of any attempt to lower tariffs on import sensitive prod-
ucts. Also, the International Trade Commission was required to conduct an assessment on 
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 Since the latest round of tariff reductions in the GATT Uruguay 
Round, in which tariffs were reduced fifteen percent, the global bulk 
juice price and average return to Florida growers has steadily de-
clined, while the price of the finished product to consumers has risen, 
demonstrating the disconnect between tariff reductions and greater 
competition, or reduced prices to consumers. 41 At the retail level, U.S. 
orange juice prices do not track declining wholesale and grower 
prices, as retail prices have increased sharply in recent years, by over 
twenty-five percent, while prices received have fallen roughly fifty 
percent from the retail level. 42  
 This pricing situation benefits the Brazilian processing structure, 
which presently owns approximately half of the processing facilities 
in Florida. Brazilian low-priced exports to the United States depress 
the prices paid to domestic growers, expanding control of the Brazil-
ian processors over world orange juice supplies. Should tariffs on or-
ange juice from Brazil be reduced or eliminated, this situation could 
be exacerbated.43 
 A reduction in the tariff would result in a significant negative im-
pact throughout the economic infrastructure of the state of Florida. 
As agricultural production is the second largest industry in Florida,44 
the results would be dramatic. Citrus is produced in over two-thirds 
of Florida’s counties, reaching nearly 1 million acres—by far the 
largest citrus growing region in the United States. 45 A loss of the $9 
billion citrus industry would result in severe consequences for state 
and local tax assessments, placing pressure on government services, 
banking, insurance, real estate, transportation and shipping, suppli-
ers, packers, fertilizer and equipment dealers, and other related in-
dustries including:  
[N]urseries that supply replacement trees to citrus groves, suppli-
ers of fertilizer and agricultural chemicals to citrus groves, suppli-
ers of irrigation and spraying systems, mechanical harvesters, and 
                                                                                                                  
the potential impact of such proposed tariff reductions on the affected industry. See 19 
U.S.C. §§ 3804(a)-(b) (2002). 
 41. The Impact of Trade Agreements: Effect of the Tokyo Round, U.S.-Israel FTA, 
U.S.-Canada FTA, NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round on the U.S. Economy: Hearing Before 
the U.S. International Trade Commission,  4-11 (2003) (statement of Andrew LaVigne, 
CEO, Florida Citrus Mutual).  
 42. Market Access, supra note 15, at 23 (citing the New York Cotton Exchange). 
 43. The United States currently has one of the lowest tariff levels among all FTAA or 
world trading partners, with tariffs averaging eleven percent as compared to Brazil, Ar-
gentina, Venezuela, and Columbia: all with tariff averages of approximately sixty-five per-
cent. See Trade Agenda, supra note 20, at 30 (citing the  FREE TRADE AREA OF THE 
AMERICAS: HEMISPHERIC TRADE AND TARIFF DATA BASE FOR MARKET ACCESS, available at 
http://www.ftaa-alca.org/NGROUPS/NGMADB_E.asp). 
 44. News Release, Florida Farm Bureau Federation, Florida Farmers in Cybe rspace 
(Nov. 21, 2002), at http://www.fb.com/flfb/newsrel/2002/Florida-FarmerWeb.html. 
 45. HODGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 3, 5.   
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farm implements, financial institutions, especially merchant banks 
that have citrus exposure, insurance companies that serve the cit-
rus industry, freight companies that haul citrus to processing 
plants.46 
 The citrus industry has always been one of the most efficient free-
market industries in U.S. agriculture, choosing not to receive part of 
the $20 billion in government price supports and subsidies enjoyed 
by other American agricultural industries, many of which receive the 
majority of their farm income from the government. While the citrus 
industry does not receive federal government subsidies, the tariff 
provides a mechanism to ensure market stability. U.S. direct pay-
ments to subsidized sectors are much more costly to the U.S. gov-
ernment and taxpayers than is the U.S. orange juice tariff, which, 
through its tariff collection, has a positive impact on the federal 
budget.47 
 Florida citrus welcomes greater access to foreign markets; how-
ever, the perceived benefits of expansion into such markets could not 
offset the dramatic impact of a tariff reduction. The current tariff 
serves to level the international playing field, roughly accounting for 
the difference in production costs between the two nations.  
 While recognizing the overall goals of free trade, given the unique 
international market, where only two states in the world produce the 
vast majority of the world’s orange juice, any reduction in the citrus 
tariff will not lead to the stated objectives of free trade, including 
greater competition and consumer choice, lower prices, or expanded 
global economic growth. Rather, a reduction in the current citrus tar-
iff would result in centralized consolidation of global citrus produc-
tion within one region of the world and would create a monopoly-type 
market environment that would dramatically curtail international 
market competition and diminish consumer choice. 
                                                                                                                  
 46. Trade Agenda, supra note 20, at 19.  
 47. Id. at 30-31. 
